Abstracts for Friday, 11 April 2014
Quassim Cassam, "Self-Ignorance and Epistemic Character"
I'll be discussing the role of epistemic character traits, such as carelessness and gullibility, in the formation of beliefs, desires, and other attitudes. I want to suggest that ignorance of the influence of such traits in the formation of one's own attitudes is a pervasive form of self-ignorance. I will argue, on this basis, against some aspects of rationalism about self-knowledge. Finally, I will say something about how reflection on the role of epistemic character traits in attitude formation suggests a response to scepticism about character.
Matthew Boyle, "Transparency and Reflection"
Paper available now; contact conference organizer for copy.
Gareth Evans famously observed that we can often answer the question whether we believe that p, not by considering our own psychology, but simply by addressing the question whether p. Much recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that this “transparency” of questions about our own mental states to questions about the wider world holds the key to understanding how privileged self-knowledge is possible. There is, however, considerable controversy about how to understand the phenomenon of transparency, and exactly what role it can play in explaining self-knowledge. I critically discuss some prominent recent approaches to these topics, and argue for a Sartrean interpretation of transparent self-knowledge, on which this knowledge is explained by our capacity to transform an implicit or “non-positional” self-awareness into reflective, “positional” self-knowledge.
Hannah Ginsborg, "Must I Know What I Mean?"
Paper available now; contact conference organizer for copy.
Discussions of “first person authority” with respect to meaning often assume that, to be a competent user of a language, I must know what I mean by the words I use. I argue against that assumption. What I need to know is not what I mean by my words, but what my words mean. I develop the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge within the framework of a broadly Wittgensteinian conception of meaning as use. Philosophers sympathetic to that construal often have difficulty making sense of the idea of noninferential knowledge of the meanings of our words. The conception of knowledge of meaning which I offer helps with that kind of difficulty.
Patricia Kitcher, "A Kantian Critique of Current Approaches to Self-Knowledge"
Paper available now; contact conference organizer for copy.
One theme of contemporary discussions of self-knowledge is that where Descartes and Locke offered attractive, but false pictures of the phenomena, Kant’s views were largely correct. I’m going to argue that this evaluation is only half right. Kant’s investigation of the necessary conditions for cognition gave him a far better understanding of self-knowledge than his predecessors, but his insights are not in perfect agreement with current approaches. In particular, I argue that he would not endorse the contemporary dogmas about the asymmetry between first and third person knowledge of belief and about self-knowledge of belief being ‘transparent’ to belief about the world. In the latter case, he would deny that coming to know that you believe, e.g. that there will be a third world war, could just a matter of looking outward at world events. You must also understand your own thinking.
Quassim Cassam, "Self-Ignorance and Epistemic Character"
I'll be discussing the role of epistemic character traits, such as carelessness and gullibility, in the formation of beliefs, desires, and other attitudes. I want to suggest that ignorance of the influence of such traits in the formation of one's own attitudes is a pervasive form of self-ignorance. I will argue, on this basis, against some aspects of rationalism about self-knowledge. Finally, I will say something about how reflection on the role of epistemic character traits in attitude formation suggests a response to scepticism about character.
Matthew Boyle, "Transparency and Reflection"
Paper available now; contact conference organizer for copy.
Gareth Evans famously observed that we can often answer the question whether we believe that p, not by considering our own psychology, but simply by addressing the question whether p. Much recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that this “transparency” of questions about our own mental states to questions about the wider world holds the key to understanding how privileged self-knowledge is possible. There is, however, considerable controversy about how to understand the phenomenon of transparency, and exactly what role it can play in explaining self-knowledge. I critically discuss some prominent recent approaches to these topics, and argue for a Sartrean interpretation of transparent self-knowledge, on which this knowledge is explained by our capacity to transform an implicit or “non-positional” self-awareness into reflective, “positional” self-knowledge.
Hannah Ginsborg, "Must I Know What I Mean?"
Paper available now; contact conference organizer for copy.
Discussions of “first person authority” with respect to meaning often assume that, to be a competent user of a language, I must know what I mean by the words I use. I argue against that assumption. What I need to know is not what I mean by my words, but what my words mean. I develop the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge within the framework of a broadly Wittgensteinian conception of meaning as use. Philosophers sympathetic to that construal often have difficulty making sense of the idea of noninferential knowledge of the meanings of our words. The conception of knowledge of meaning which I offer helps with that kind of difficulty.
Patricia Kitcher, "A Kantian Critique of Current Approaches to Self-Knowledge"
Paper available now; contact conference organizer for copy.
One theme of contemporary discussions of self-knowledge is that where Descartes and Locke offered attractive, but false pictures of the phenomena, Kant’s views were largely correct. I’m going to argue that this evaluation is only half right. Kant’s investigation of the necessary conditions for cognition gave him a far better understanding of self-knowledge than his predecessors, but his insights are not in perfect agreement with current approaches. In particular, I argue that he would not endorse the contemporary dogmas about the asymmetry between first and third person knowledge of belief and about self-knowledge of belief being ‘transparent’ to belief about the world. In the latter case, he would deny that coming to know that you believe, e.g. that there will be a third world war, could just a matter of looking outward at world events. You must also understand your own thinking.